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The West German Day-Fine System: A
Possibility for the United States?
Through two reforms enacted in 1969,1 the West German fed-
eral parliament revitalized the fine as a criminal sanction. The
First Criminal Law Reform Act mandated that the fine be the pri-
mary sanction for crimes formerly punishable by a prison term of
six months or less. 2 The Second Criminal Law Reform Act strik-
ingly changed the method of calculating the fine amount. Under
the new method, modeled on the Scandinavian "day-fine" system,3
the fine for any particular crime is not a fixed sum but is a variable
figure adjusted to the wealth and income of the offender. Whereas
a fixed fine could impose severe economic hardship on a poor of-
fender but cause nothing more than a minor reduction in con-
sumption for the offender of means, the West German variable fine
1 Erstes Gesetz zur Reform des Strafrechts (First Criminal Law Reform Act) of June
25, 1969 [1. StrRG], 1969 Bundesgesetzblatt [BGB1] I 645 (W. Ger.) [hereinafter cited as
First Criminal Law Reform Act]; Zweites Gesetz zur Reform des Strafrechts (Second Crimi-
nal Law Reform Act) of July 4, 1969 [2. StrRG], 1969 BGBi I 717 (W. Ger.) [hereinafter
cited as Second Criminal Law Reform Act]. The Second Criminal Law Reform Act did not
go into effect in its final version until January 1, 1975. Bekanntmachung der Neufassung des
Strafgesetzbuches (proclamation of the new criminal code) of Jan. 2, 1975, 1975 BGBl I 1
(W. Ger.).
' See First Criminal Law Reform Act, supra note 1, § 14 (codified at Strafgesetzbuch
(criminal code) [StGB] § 47 (W. Ger. 1975)).
Eser, The Politics of Criminal Law Reform: Germany, 21 AM. J. Comp. L. 245, 256
(1973). For a description of the system in Sweden, see Thornstedt, The Day-Fine System in
Sweden, 1975 CRIM. L. REv. 307, 307.
4 See infra notes 39-50 and accompanying text. The idea of adjusting fines to the
means of the offender has gained popularity in the twentieth century, see infra note 6, but
the idea itself is not a new one. See Note, Fines and Fining-An Evaluation, 101 U. PA. L.
REv. 1013, 1024 (1953). For example, in thirteenth-century England, the amount of an
amercement was fixed with regard to the offender's wealth. Id. at 1024 & n.86. Jeremy Ben-
tham advocated variable fines in his work TiE THEORY OF LEGISLATON 217 (U. Baxi ed.
1975) (1st ed. Paris 1802) ("Pecuniary punishments should always be regulated by the for-
tune of the offender. The relative amount of the fine should be fixed, not its absolute
amount. . . ."), quoted in Posner, Optimal Sentences for White-Collar Criminals, 17 AM.
ClM. L. REv. 409, 415 n.17 (1980).
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is designed to have a proportionate impact across all economic
strata.5
The West German and, indeed, general Europeans reliance on
the variable fine has not gone unnoticed by American commenta-
tors.7 Against the backdrop of overcrowded" and costly9 prison sys-
tems, American commentators have seen the European day-fine as
a panacea for America's troubled correctional systems.10 Those rec-
' See infra notes 42-44 and accompanying text.
6 In the twentieth century, the day-fine has been legislatively adopted in several Scandi-
navian nations. Finland enacted it in 1921. Sweden and Denmark followed in 1931 and 1939
respectively. Thornstedt, supra note 3, at 307. Austria adopted the day-fine simultaneously
with West Germany in 1975. Austria's adoption was profoundly influenced by the West Ger-
man proposal and the arguments of its proponents. Driendl, Entwicklung und Neuregelung
der Geldstrafe nach dem Tagessatzsystem in Osterreich, in DIE GELDSTRAFE IM DEUTSCHEN
UND AUSLXNDISCHEN REcHT 659, 663-65 (H.-H. Jescheck & G. Grebing eds. 1978). In 1938
Cuba also adopted the day-fine system. Note, supra note 4, at 1024-25 & n.92.
This comment focuses on West German practice for two reasons. First, among all Euro-
pean nations currently using day-fines, West Germany is the principal nation to have
adopted the system within the last decade, see supra note 1, and therefore is well suited for
analyzing the problems of a contemporary adoption of the variable fine. Second, the West
German adoption was preceded by a protracted and well-documented academic discussion
detailing the advantages of the day-fine over incarceration. See infra notes 12-35 and ac-
companying text. The American reader thus can glean from the West German discussion
the arguments supporting the day-fine.
' See, e.g., N. MoIs, THE FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT 8 (1974); Carter & Cole, The Use
of Fines in England: Could the Idea Work Here?., 63 JUDICATuRE 154 (1979); Gillespie, Fines
as an Alternative to Incarceration: The German Experience, FED. PROBATION, Dec. 1980, at
20.
, High inmate density has been one of the factors that have led federal courts to hold
entire state prison systems in violation of the Constitution. See, e.g., Gates v. Collier, 501
F.2d 1291 (5th Cir. 1974) (Mississippi); Lightfoot v. Walker, 486 F. Supp. 504 (S.D. Ill.
1980); Pugh v. Locke, 406 F. Supp. 318 (M.D. Ala. 1976), aff'd sub nom. Newman v. Ala-
bama, 559 F.2d 283 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 438 U.S. 915 (1977); Hamilton v. Schiro, 338 F.
Supp. 1016 (E.D. La. 1970); Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark. 1970), afl'd, 442
F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1971).
9 Ther combined cost to society of prisoner maintenance and lost labor has been esti-
mated to lie between $50,000 and $80,000 per prisoner per year. M. SHERMAN & G. HAwKINs,
IMPRISONMENT IN AMERICA 2 (1981).
10 See, e.g., N. MORRIS, supra note 7. Morris writes:
[T]here has been an overemphasis on custody. It is widely recognized that we have
locked up too many social nuisances who are not social threats, too many petty offend-
ers and minor thieves, severing such few social ties as they have and pushing them
further toward more serious criminal behavior. This excessive use of incarceration, the
prison and the jail, the reformatory and the detention center, has been expensive,
criminogenic, and unkind. "
Id. at 7-8. As a replacement for short-term imprisonment, Morris recommends, inter alia,
the day-fine:
There is also support for increased reliance on the fine and on restitution and compen-
sation payments to the victims of crimes as an alternative to imprisonment. This is a
wholly sound development which should be extended by the adoption of systems like
the Swedish "day fine" and time payment arrangements adjusted to the economic real-
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ommending adoption of the West German practice, however, have
evaluated West Germany's practical experience with the day-fine
system in a cursory manner.11 This comment provides a more com-
prehensive evaluation of the West German experience. Part I ex-
amines the impetus to reform and the resulting statutes. Part II
describes West Germany's experience under the new laws and con-
cludes that although the day-fine system in West Germany in some
respects has fallen short of the goals of the reformers, the West
German courts have reduced their use of short-term imprisonment
and have succeeded in collecting most of their fines. The comment
then turns to the United States and identifies some factors that
could make American experience with a day-fine system different
from that of West Germany.
I. THE REFORMS
A. History of the Reform Legislation
The West German government formed a Grand Commission
("Grosse Strafrechtskommission") in 1954 to revise the then-ex-
ities of the lives of convicted persons.
Id. at 8. Similarly, Carter & Cole, supra note 7, write that
[p]olicymakers should consider the expanded use of the fine, especially for those first
offenders who now are given probation or a suspended sentence. In many states, the
probation officer's caseload is so great that the only persons who receive any type of
supervision are those who have been convicted of the most serious offenses; as a result,
probation as an alternative to incarceration has become something of a joke ...
Would not a fine be more consistent with the concepts of deserved punishment and
deterrence?
Id. at 161 (footnote omitted).
" For example, Gillespie, supra note 7, offers statistics showing a decrease in the total
number of short-term prison sentences handed down by West German courts sinqe the re-
form, a relatively stable number of convictions, id. at 21, and a low level of default imprison-
ment, id. at 23, and then baldly asserts that "[a]n overall assessment of the German experi-
ence, as it relates to the substitution of fines for incarceration, is that it has accomplished its
goal without either a significant cost in terms of higher rates of crime or incarceration for
fine default," id. at 24. The statement is misleading and incomplete. It is misleading because
a decrease in the total number of short-term sentences could be the result of imposing fines
for one particular type of crime-for example, traffic crime-formerly punishable by impris-
onment. Accomplishment of the reform's goal-reducing the number of short-term prison
sentences as a sanction for all crimes, see infra notes 20-23 and accompanying text-would
have to be evidenced by a decrease in the number of short-term prison sentences handed
down for all crimes, including those traditionally punished by a prison term.
Gillespie's statement is incomplete because an "overall assessment" of the West Ger-
man experience should certainly "relate" to more than the replacement of incarceration
with fines. One would like to know whether West German courts accurately adjust fines to
offender means, whether West German courts have access to information about offender
wealth, and whether such information, if available, is reflected in the fine amount.
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isting Criminal Code, which had been in force since 1871.12 After
eight years, the Commission issued the Draft Penal Code E 196213
("E 1962"). The draft included provisions allowing fines to replace
short-term imprisonment and requiring the fines to be calculated
on a per diem basis.14 In particular, E 1962 mandated that a fine
be imposed in lieu of imprisonment of up to three months "if...
the fine will suffice to. . . warn[] . . . the perpetrator, and neither
the degree of guilt nor the purpose of punishment to deter crimes
requires imprisonment. '15
Many criminal law scholars at West German and Swiss univer-
sities criticized E 1962 severely 6 and published their own Alterna-
tive Draft Code,1 7 which was introduced as a bill by the Free Dem-
ocratic Party.18 The Alternative Draft's authors had hoped that the
Commission would eliminate the abstract understanding of punish-
ment they perceived in the 1871 Code and substitute a purposeful
penological program in its stead.19 They were particularly disap-
12 Gillespie, supra note 7, at 20. The Code of 1871 was the product of Germany's nine-
teenth-century law codification movement. J. BAUMANN, KLEINE STRErrsCHRIFTEN ZUR
STRAFRECHTSREFORM 14-15 (1965). The only criminal code common to the German states
prior to 1871 dated back to the sixteenth century. Id. at 15.
13 Entwurf eines Strafgesetzbuches, E 1962 (draft of a criminal code, E 1962), DRUCK-
SACHEN DES DEUTSCHEN BUNDESTAGES [BTDRuCKS.] 4/650 (W. Ger. 1962) [hereinafter cited
as Entwurf eines Strafgesetzbuches]. The draft is available in English under the title THE
GERMAN DRAFT PENAL CODE E 1962 (N. Ross trans. 1966) [hereinafter cited as E 1962].
14 See E 1962, supra note 13, §§ 51, 53.
Id. § 53(1).
18 See Baumann, Vorwort, in MISSLINGT DIE STRAFRECHTSREFORM? 7, 7 (J. Baumann ed.
1969); Gillespie, supra note 7, at 20; Grebing, Die Geldstrafe im deutschen Recht nach
Einfrlhrung des Tagessatzsystems, in DIE GELDSTRAFE IM DEUTSCHEN UND AUSLXNDISCHEN
RECiT 13, 37-38 (H.-H. Jescheck & G. Grebing eds. 1978). Jrargen Baumann, one of the
principal critics of E 1962, characterized the Commission's work as "'dusty, petty-bourgeois,
pecksniffian, in many ways mendacious and trampling underfoot the sensitivities of numer-
ous citizens, replete with pedantry and perfectionism."' Eser, supra note 3, at 247 (quoting
J. BAUMANN, supra note 12, at 29). Baumann acknowledged that his language was too
strong. J. BAUMANN, supra note 12, at 29.
17 ALTERNATIV-ENTWURF EmEs STRAFGESETZBUCHES, Allgemeiner Teil (alternative draft
criminal code, general part) (W. Ger. 1966). The draft is available in English under the title
ALTERNATIVE DRAFT PENAL CODE FOR THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY (J. Darby trans.
1977) [hereinafter cited as ALTERNATIVE DRAFT].
18 Eser, supra note 3, at 248.
" The Alternative Draft's authors criticized E 1962 primarily for being an inadequate
departure from the 1871 Code. See J. BAUMANN, supra note 12, at 22. See also ALTERNATVE
DRAFT, supra note 17, at 35-36 (commentary by J. Baumann) ("In contrast to the 1962
government draft, the Alternative Draft was not so much designed to 'advance' the theory of
criminal law."). The 1871 Code had been written under the strong influence of Prussian
penological thinking and at its core mirrored the Prussian Criminal Code of 1851. J. BAU-
MANN, supra note 12, at 15. Following its Prussian predecessor, the 1871 Code stressed the
accountability of the individual for his free choice to commit illegal acts. The Code defined
each crime distinctly and prescribed harsh penalties. Baumann contended that the 1871
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pointed by E 1962's failure to eliminate the short-term prison sen-
tence,2 ° which, according to the Alternative Draft's authors, could
not be reconciled with any rehabilitative goal. They argued that
short-term imprisonment, rather than facilitating the offender's re-
turn to noncriminal activity upon release, breaks whatever positive
ties the offender had to society and pushes him further into the
criminal class.21 Accordingly, the Alternative Draft eliminated
short-term imprisonment and set six months as the minimum
prison term.22 To replace short-term prison sentences, the Alterna-
tive Draft's authors proposed fines, because fines punish by reduc-
ing the offender's ability to consume without forcing the offender
to break all positive social ties.23
The First Criminal Law Reform Act effected a compromise be-
tween the Alternative Draft and E 1962.24 The new law did not
adopt the Alternative Draft's proposed abolition of short-term im-
prisonment altogether, but, unlike E 1962, it established an ex-
tremely strong presumption against such imprisonment. As codi-
fied, the legislation directs the courts to impose prison sentences of
less than six months "only when special circumstances, present in
the act or in the personality of the offender, make the imposition
of the sentence indispensable for effecting an impression on the
Code imposed punishment for the sole purpose of discharging guilt generated by the deci-
sion to commit a misdeed. In support of his view that the 1871 Code imposed punishment
for abstract purposes, Baumann cited Hegel's blunt formulation that punishment is the ne-
gation of a negation. He also cited Kant's statement that even if the State voluntarily were
to disband, it first would have to execute the last convicted murderer, lest his guilt adhere
to the rest of society. Id.
20 See ALTERNATIVE DRAFT, supra note 17, at 36-37 (commentary of J. Baumann). Al-
though E 1962 provided for fines in lieu of imprisonment, see supra note 15 and accompa-
nying text, the section so providing was inapplicable whenever "imprisonment of three
months is the minimum for the prescribed punishment applied by the court in the particu-
lar case." E 1962, supra note 13, § 53(2).
1, In remarks accompanying the Alternative Draft, Jrgen Baumann stated:
A short jail sentence does not serve to rehabilitate the offender because the period of
confinement is too short to be effective. It is, however, well designed to inculcate in the
offender patterns of criminal behavior. By removing him from his family and employ-
ment, the short jail sentence subjects the offender to all the dangers of a criminal
environment.
ALTERNATIVE DRAFT, supra note 17, at 36-37. The West German federal parliament's select
committee for criminal law reform made the same argument in ERSTER SCHRIFTLICHER BER-
ICHT DES SONDERAUSSCHUSSES FOR DIE STRAFRECHTSREFORM (the official motivation to the
1969 reform), BTDRuCKs. 5/4094, at 5 (W. Ger. 1969).
22 ALTERNATIVE DRAFT, supra note 17, § 36(1).
13 See id. at 44-45. E 1962 would have allowed fines to replace prison sentences, but
only in substantially more limited circumstances. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
, Grebing, supra note 16, at 39. See ALTERNATIVE DRAFT, supra note 17, at 37 (com-
mentary of J. Baumann).
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offender or defending the legal order. '2 5 The reform legislation
thus directs courts to impose the fine as the primary sanction even
for those crimes-such as theft, fraud, and battery-traditionally
penalized by imprisonment in West Germany.2 6
Both of the draft codes, E 1962 and the Alternative Draft, pro-
posed variable fine systems,2 7 but the drafts differed in how they
calculated the fines. E 1962's day-fine method separated the fine
into a component adjusted for the gravity of the offense and a
component adjusted for the offender's income.28 It thereby offered
a calculation procedure from which both an offender and a review-
ing court29 could discern the reasons underlying the amount of the
fine.30 The formalized method of adjustment could also serve to
effect equality of justice,3l for without such adjustment it is not
possible to ensure that fines have the same proportionate impact
on affluent and poor offenders. Finally, fine adjustment can de-
crease the likelihood of nonpayment and reduce the costs associ-
ated with fine enforcement, because most offenders would be able
to pay an accurately adjusted day-fine.32
The variable fine in the Alternative Draft was also designed to
effect an equal impact on all offenders, but its authors intended
the fine to replicate imprisonment outside of prison: the fine would
take enough income from each offender to place him at a subsis-
tence level.33 These fines would be long-term ("Laufzeitgeld-
15 StGB § 47(1) ("Eine Freiheitsstrafe unter sechs Monaten verhingt das Gericht nur,
wenn besondere Umstande, die in der Tat odor Pers6nlichkeit des Titers liegen, die
Verhngung einer Freiheitsstrafe zur Einwirkung auf den Tditer oder zur Verteidigung der
Rechtsordnung unerlasslich machen.") (emphasis added). This section is a codification of
the First Criminal Law Reform Act, supra note 1, § 14, 1969 BGB1 I at 646.
26 See generally infra notes 75-79 and accompanying text.
27 See E 1962, supra note 13, § 51 ("Fines shall be imposed on a per diem basis. A fine
shall amount to at least one per diem charge, and if a statutory provision does not provide
otherwise, at most to.three hundred and sixty per diem charges."); ALTERNATIv DRAFT,
supra note 17, § 49(1) ("Fines shall be imposed in daily, weekly or monthly rates. The time
in which fines shall be paid extends from a minimum of one day to a maximum of twenty-
four months.").
2' E 1962, supra note 13, § 51.
, See infra note 60.
'oSee Entwurf eines Strafgesetzbuches, supra note 13, at 169-70 (Begriindung); ERsTER
BERICHT DES SONDERAUSSCHUSSES FOR DIE STRAFRECHTSREFORM (first report of the select
committee for criminal law reform), BTDRucKs. 7/1261, at 5 (W. Ger. 1973); Grebing, supra
note 16, at 81.
31 See H.-J. ALBRECHT, STRAzuMESSUNG UND VOLLSTRECKUNG BEM GELDSTRAPEN UNTER
BEROCKSICHTIGUNG DES TAGESSATZSYSTEMS 195 (1980); Entwurf eines Strafgesetzbuches,
supra note 13, at 169-70.
32 See H.-J. ALBRECHT, supra note 31, at 196.
33 ALTERNATIVE DRAFT, supra note 17, § 49; see Grebing, supra note 16, at 82.
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strafen") and payable in installments over a period lasting up to
two years.3 4 Because this scheme was extremely cumbersome, the
legislature rejected it and instead codified E 1962's fine system in
the Second Criminal Law Reform Act. 5
B. The Mechanics of the Day-Fine
Before the Criminal Law Reform Acts, West German courts
merely had to "'consider the economic circumstances of the of-
fender'" in calculating a fine.36 This very general formulation al-
lowed judges to set fines arbitrarily and made it difficult to discern
whether the amount of the fine reflected the offender's wealth or
the severity of his crime.3 7 The Second Criminal Law Reform Act
restricted judicial discretion and capriciousness by establishing for-
mal rules for fine computation.
Sections 40 through 46 of the West German Criminal Code 8
set forth the essential provisions of the day-fine system. The Code
directs the sentencing court to set the total fine amount equal to
the product of two factors.3 9 The first factor-the number of day-
fine units ("Tagessiitze")-measures the culpability of the of-
fender; 40 it ensures that the fine reflects the gravity of the offense.
In setting the first factor, the court should examine the motivation
of the offender, the method by which the crime was carried out,
and mitigating and aggravating circumstances.41 In theory, all of-
fenders who commit a like crime will incur the same number of
day-fine units. Through the second factor-the value of the day-
fine unit-the court adjusts the total fine amount to the "personal
and economic circumstances of the offender. 4 2 The court should
31 ALTERNATIVE DRAFT, supra note 17, § 49(1).
35 StGB § 40. This section of the criminal code codifies the day-fine concepts expressed
in the Second Criminal Law Reform Act, supra note 1, § 40, 1969 BGBI I at 722. See Greb-
ing, supra note 16, at 83-84. The fine systems of the drafts differed in one other respect.
The Alternative Draft would allow a court to order satisfaction of a fine through community
charity work on the application of the offender. ALTERNATn DRAFT, supra note 17, § 52. E
1962 contains no similar provision.
3 See Entwurf eines Strafgesetzbuches, supra note 13, at 169 ("'Bei der Bemessung
einer Geldstrafe sind die wirtschaftlichen Verh.ltnisse des Tters zu berricksichtigen. ")
(quoting former StGB § 27(c)) (emphasis added).
37 Id., cited in Grebing, supra note 16, at 88.
- StGB §§ 40-46.
" Id. § 40(2).
40 Id. § 46.
41 Id.
42 Id. § 40(2) ("Die H6he des Tagessatzes bestimmt das Gericht unter Berilcksichtigung
der persinlichen und wirtschaftlichen Verhaltnisse des Titers. Dabei geht es in der Regel
von dem Nettoeinkommen aus, das der Tater durchschnittlich an einem Tag hat oder haben
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set the value of each day-fine unit equal to some fraction of the
offender's average net daily income.43 The West German Criminal
Code does not specify what fraction the court is to use for this
calculation, but the fraction cannot be so high as to deprive the
offender or his dependents of a minimal living standard." If, for
example, the day-fine unit equals one-third of the offender's net
daily income,45 his deed is sufficiently serious to merit twenty day-
fines, and his net daily income is sixty marks, then the total fine
will lie 400 marks (20 x 1/3 x 60). If, however, the offender earns
only fifteen marks per day, then the fine will amount to only 100
marks.
Because the criminal code mandates that both the number of
day-fine units and the value of each unit be published in the
court's decision, 6 the composition of the fine is transparent. The
phases setting the two factors are to be independent; nonetheless,
the judge is not expected to carry out his computations without
due consideration for the final product.47 Moreover, the number of
day-fine units may neither exceed 360 nor be fewer than five, ' and
the value of each unit must be less than 10,000 marks and greater
than two marks.49 Thus, the total fine for a single offense 50 can fall
between ten and 3,600,000 marks.
The net daily income of the offender for purposes of computa-
tion is the sum of all revenues derived from salary, dividends, in-
terest, pensions, and welfare benefits,51 less taxes, insurance premi-
ums, and, for the self-employed, business expenses and losses.52
Difficulties arise when the offender has a low income or no income
at all, as with individuals who give up their jobs in anticipation of
k6nnte.").
4 See id.
4 See A. SCHONKE & H. SCHRODER, STRAFGESETZBUCH KOMMENTAR (criminal code &
commentary) § 40 Rdn. 8 (20th ed. 1980); Trondle, Verhangung in Tagessitzen, in
STRAFGESETZBUCH LEIPZIGER KOMMENTAR § 40 Rdn. 19 (H.-H. Jescheck, W. Russ & G.
Willms eds. 10th ed. 1978).
'5 This is a reasonable assumption in light of the practice in Sweden of setting each
day-fine unit equal to one one-thousandth of the offender's annual income, which is approx-
imately equal to one-third of one day's income. See Thornstedt, supra note 3, at 309.
46 StGB § 40(4).
47 See A. SCHONKE & H. SCHRODER, supra note 44, § 40 Rdn. 5; Tr6ndle, supra note 44,
§ 40 Rdn. 16.
48 StGB § 40(1).
49 Id. § 40(2).
50 For multiple offenses, the number of day-fine units may not exceed 720. Id. § 54(2).
Thus, the absolute upper limit to the day-fine amount is 7.2 million marks.
51 See Grebing, supra note 16, at 101; Tr6ndle, supra note 44, § 40 Rdn. 22.
5 See Grebing, supra note 16, at 101; Tr6ndle, supra note 44, § 40 Rdn. 23.
[50:281
1983] West German Day-Fine System
a fine, students, housewives, and the chronically unemployed, but
it is possible to impute income in such circumstances.5 Even in
the more typical case, where the offender is employed, it can be
difficult to calculate his net daily income. A West German offender
cannot be compelled to provide the court with financial informa-
tion.54 The court thus must depend on the defendant's voluntary
disclosure of income and on the public prosecutor's report inform-
ing the court of the offender's occupation, education, and resi-
dence.5 5 If the offender works in a profession characterized by wage
uniformity, the information in the report may be enough to iden-
tify his income.5 6 The offender may be more willing to disclose his
income if the court exercises its authority to clear the courtroom
when personal financial matters are being discussed. 57 Similarly,
because the court is permitted to estimate the personal and eco-
nomic circumstances of an offender,58 fear of an overestimate may
induce an offender to provide the court with income information. 9
5' Much writing has been devoted to methods of ascribing income in such circum-
stances. Some commentators recommend assigning a hypothetical or potential income to
students and people who give up their jobs in anticipation of a fine. See, e.g., A. SCHONKE &
H. SCHRODER, supra note 44, § 40 Rdn. 11. But see Tr6ndle, supra note 44, § 40 Rdn. 31
(students generally have income equal to sum of wages, allowance from parents, and state
support). One suggestion is that a housewife should be assigned an income equal to the
actual support she receives from her husband during marriage, see A. SCHONKE & H. SCHRO-
DER, supra note 44, § 40 Rdn. la, while another proposes that a housewife's income be
assigned the value of a hypothetical support claim she could secure from her husband if
they separated, see Grebing, supra note 16, at 103-06. See also Tr6ndle, supra note 44, § 40
Rdn. 28 (a support claim may differ substantially from the amount a housewife receives
from her husband while married). In the case of an unemployed offender, the court might
assign an income equal to welfare benefits plus imputed income obtained in the form of food
and lodging donated by others. See Grebing, supra note 16, at 107.
"See A. SCHONKE & H. SCHRODER, supra note 44, § 40 Rdn. 19. The Alternative Draft,
supra note 17, § 49, would have authorized courts to obtain information from banking and
financial institutions about the offender's income, and, if the information were insufficient,
the courts would have been permitted to estimate the income and adjust the fine accord-
ingly. E 1962 also would have permitted income estimation, E 1962, supra note 13, § 51(3),
but it did not direct the court to outside sources. A more recent legislative proposal would
have required administrative agencies to release the offender's financial records and tax re-
turns, Entwurf eines Einfalhrungsgesetzes zum Strafgesetzbuch [EGStGB] (Draft of a prefa-
tory law to the criminal code) art. 19, No. 51, BTDRucKs. 7/550, at 300-01 (W. Ger. 1975),
but the proposal was defeated in the drafting stage, see A. SCHONKE & H. SCHRODER, supra
note 44, § 40 Rdn. 19; Grebing, supra note 16, at 117.
55 See generally J. LANGBEIN, COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: GERMANY 71 (1977).
." In West Germany, large national unions can set pay scales on an industrywide basis
by means of comprehensive wage agreements termed "Tarifvertrige." See generally
CRE nELDS REcHTswJRTERucH 1088-89 (4th ed. 1976).
57 Gerichtsverfassungsgesetz [GVG] § 172(2) (W. Ger. 1975); see A. SCHONK & H.
SCHRO DER, supra note 44, § 40 Rdn. 19.
StGB § 40(3).
" See A. SCHONKE & H. SCHRODER, supra note 44, § 40 Rdn. 20.
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But if the offender does not supply the court with information
about his income, and his profession is not one characterized by
wage uniformity, it is difficult for a court to set an accurate fine.e0
The West German Criminal Code in all cases grants the court
discretion to adjust the time period for payment of the day-fine. If
an immediate lump sum payment cannot reasonably be expected
from the offender, the court may order installment payments or set
a grace period before collection."1 If an offender does not pay his
fine, the Code allows the fine to be converted into a prison sen-
tence at the "exchange rate" of one day in prison for each day-fine
unit.6 2 The Code does not, however, give the offender the preroga-
tive to serve his sentence in prison rather than satisfy the fine. The
fine is the primary sanction, and the enforcement agency is author-
ized to garnish wages and attach property in order to collect the
court-prescribed fine. 3 Only when all these devices fail may the
• Either party may request appellate review of the trial court's determination of the
total fine amount. See Tr5ndle, supra note 44, § 40 Rdn. 79. An appellate court may on
request separately review the trial court's determination of the value of the day-fine unit.
Id. § 40 Rdn. 76. Under the prevailing view, however, the appellate court may not separately
review the trial court's determination of the number of day-fine units. Id. § 40 Rdn. 77.
If the defendant, or the public prosecutor acting in favor of the defendant, requests
appellate review, then the appellate court is subject to the so-called prohibition on worsen-
ing ("Verschlechterungsverbot"), under which the review may not result in a total fine
amount exceeding that imposed by the trial court. Strafprozessordnung (code of criminal
procedure) [StPO] §§ 331, 358(2), 373(2) (W. Ger. 1979). Thus, if the trial court imposes a
600 DM fine (20 units at 30 DM per unit) and the appellate court reduces the number of
units to 15, then the appellate court may revalue the day-fine unit at a maximum of 40 (15 x
40 = 600) even if the offender's income increases in the meantime so as to justify setting
the day-fine unit at 70 DM. Tr6ndle, supra note 44, § 40 Rdn. 79. In no event may the
appellate court increase the number of day-fine units; such an increase would constitute a
per se violation of the prohibition on worsening because the numbei of day-fine units poten-
tially is convertible into days of default imprisonment. Id.
a' StGB § 42.
62 Id. § 43.
" The procedure for fine collection in pertinent part is as follows. The offender is given
notice to pay, with two weeks allowed for payment. If payment does not follow, the offender
is issued a second warning. Upon the offender's failure to heed the warnings, the enforce-
ment authority ("Vollstreckungsbeharde") is authorized to allow installment payments or to
reduce the fine amount. If payment still does not follow, the enforcement agency may exe-
cute against the offender's real and personal property. The enforcement agency must use
the method of execution most expedient to collection of the fine with due consideration to
the personal circumstances of the offender and his dependents. Accordingly, the enforce-
ment authority rarely executes against real property because this method is both cumber-
some for the authority and burdensome for the offender's dependents. When attachment
efforts fail to yield satisfactory amounts, default imprisonment follows as the enforcement
technique of last resort. See LwE-RosENBERG, Di. STRAPPROZESSORDNUNG UND DAS GER-
ICHTSVERFASSUNGSGEsE-rZ: GROSSKOMMENTAR (criminal procedure code, judiciary act & com-
mentary) § 459 (23d ed. 1978).
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enforcement agency convert the sanction to a prison sentence."'
II. GERMANY'S EXPERIENCE FOLLOWING THE REFORMS
Statistics for the years since the reforms reveal that West Ger-
many has succeeded in significantly reducing the number of short-
term prison sentences. The reforms also have been successful in
achieving a low rate of fine payment default. As this part demon-
strates,6 5 however, West German sentencing and fining practices
may not have changed as much as some of the reformers had
hoped they would.
A. Reduced Reliance on the Short-Term Prison Sentence
Measured solely in terms of reduced reliance on short-term in-
carceration as a sanction, the First Criminal Law Reform Act must
be termed a success. Before the Act, in 1965, a myriad of offenses,
such as embezzlement,68 incitement to riot,6 7 adultery, 8 conducting
a gambling operation, 9 and some degrees of manslaughter, ° were
punishable by prison sentences of six months or less. In fact,
eighty-five percent of all prison sentences in 1966 were for a period
of six months or less.7 1 In 1968 the total number of such sentences
was 113,273, but in 1970, the first year after the Reform Act, the
number of nonsuspended prison sentences for a term of up to six
months had dropped to 23,664.2 By 1979 the number of nonsus-
pended sentences declined to 10,609.73 In that year, fines consti-
" StPO § 459(e)(2).
" This part is based largely on the findings of the Max Planck Institute for Foreign
and International Criminal Law, Freiburg im Breisgau, West Germany, as reported in H.-J.
ALBRECHT, supra note 31.
a$ A. SCHONKE & H. SCHRODER, supra note 44, § 246 (12th ed. 1965) (maximum five-
year sentence).
17 Id. § 130 (minimum three-month sentence).
:8 Id. § 172 (maximum six-month sentence).
"Id. § 284 (maximum six-month sentence).
70 Id. § 228 (manslaughter with mitigating circumstances) (minimum three-month
sentence).
71 Quensel, Kurze Freiheitsstrafen: Das Dilemma der Strafrechtsreform, in MISSLINGT
DIE STRAFRECHTSREFORM? 108, 108 (J. Baumann ed. 1969). The burden on West German
prisons was correspondingly high. In 1966, more than 40% of West German prisoners were
held in "community cells." Id. at 113. One-half of all such inmates were serving short-term
sentences. Id. The frequent committals and discharges of prisoners serving short-term
sentences added greatly to the bureaucratic costs of the prison system. Id.
7' ANTWORT DER BUNDESREGIERUNG (answer of the federal government), BTDRucKs. 7/
1089, at 2 (W. Ger. 1973), reprinted in Gillespie, supra note 7, at 21.
73 STATISTISCHES BUNDESAMT, RECHTSPFLEGE (Reihe 3, Strafverfolgung 1979) 72-73
(1980) (Table 6) [hereinafter cited as RECHTSPFLEGE 1979]. In addition to the 10,609 short-
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tuted about eighty-two percent, nonsuspended short-term
sentences about two percent, and suspended short-term sentences
about eight percent of all sentences imposed in West Germany. 4
Reduction in the total number of short-term prison sentences
does not exhaust the goals of those reformers, such as the authors
of the Alternative Draft, who sought to eliminate the short-term
prison sentence for all crimes. Statistics reveal that imprisonment
tends to be used disproportionately as the sanction for certain
crimes. In 1972 over seventy percent of the fines imposed by West
German courts were for traffic crimes, such as reckless and drunk
driving.7 5 Conversely, sentences for theft accounted for a dispro-
portionately large fraction of all prison sentences imposed by West
German courts.76 Battery and fraud similarly were sanctioned in
large measure by imprisonment. 77 This distribution suggests that
West German courts persist in perceiving crimes such as theft, bat-
tery, and fraud as crimes for which the fine is an inappropriate
sanction.
Table 1 indicates the distribution of fines and prison sentences
for the above-mentioned offenses in 1972.71 The table reveals that
West German courts rarely sanction offenders convicted of theft,
battery, or fraud with high fines (fines above 1000 marks). The
prison sentence and the low fine are the principal sanctions for
those offenders. Courts are~willing to impose fines for petty forms
of theft, battery, and fraud. For serious forms of those crimes, the
offenses for which there is competition between high fines and im-
prisonment as a sanction, courts persist in imposing the latter.
This contrasts with the sanctioning pattern for serious traffic of-
fenses, for which courts consider the high fine an appropriate
sanction.
term sentences, West German judges handed down 39,815 suspended sentences in 1979. Id.
74 See id.
" H.-J. ALBRECHT, supra note 31, at 72.
76 Id.
77 Id. See infra Table 1 and note 78.
71 Table 1, in text, is adapted from, and uses statistics provided by, a similar table in
H.-J. ALBRECHT, supra note 31, at 73. The statistics on those people sentenced to prison are
somewhat ambiguous for the purposes of this comment because the table does not make
clear whether the term "Freiheitsstrafe" (imprisonment) includes prison sentences of over
six months. The point is significant since the First Criminal Law Reform Act discouraged
imposition only of sentences under six months. Statistics drawn from an independent source
that does distinguish between short- and long-term imprisonment, however, reveal the same
trend. See RECH'rSPFLEGE 1979, supra note 73, at 72-75 (Tables 6 & 7); STATiSTiSCHES
BUNDESAMT, RECHTSPFLEGE (Reihe 3, Strafverfolgung 1976) 70-73 (1977) (Tables 6 & 7)
[hereinafter cited as RECHTSPFLEGE 1976]. Statistics from the years 1979 and 1976 are sum-
marized in the following tables:
[50:281
1983] West German Day-Fine System
TABLE 1
Distribution of Penalties for Certain Offenses in 1972
Crime
Theft Battery Fraud Reckless Drunk
Driving Driving
Fine in
Marks 0-500 52.2% 46.8% 42.1% 7.5% 11.2%
501-1000 9.6% 24.2% 14.9% 43.9% 45.8%
1000 or more 4.1% 12.1% 7.0% 38.2% 32.3%
Prison
Sentence 33.7% 16.9% 36.0% 10.4% 10.8%
SOURCE: H.-J. ALBRECHT, supra note 31, at 73 (based on survey conducted in Ba-
den-Wiirttemberg).
In summary, the First Criminal Law Reform Act has reduced
West Germany's reliance on short-term imprisonment as a sanc-
tion. Nevertheless, a fairly large proportion of offenders convicted
of certain offenses, perhaps identifiable as classic prison offenses,
are punished with a prison sentence, not with a fine. The reform's
1979
Sanction Crime
Crimes Against
the Person Traffic Crimes
30 day-fine units
or less 21,391 (47.4%) 166,549 (58.3%)
31 to 180 day-fine
units 8,415 (18.7%) 90,423 (31.6%)
Imprisonment of six
months or less 10,356 (23.0%) 25,152 (8.8%)
Other 4,940 (10.9%) 3,630 (1.3%)
Total 45,102 285,754
SOURCE: Derived from RECHTSPFLEGE 1979, supra note 73, at 72-75 (Tables 6 & 7).
1976
Sanction Crime
Crimes Against
the Person Traffic Crimes
30 day-fine units
or less 22,555 (49.4%) 191,614 (67.1%)
31 to 180 day-fine
units 6,310 (13.8%) 68,441 (24.0%)
imprisonment of six
months or less 11,023 (24.1%) 22,571 (7.9%)
Other 5,815 (12.7%) 2,834 (1.0%)
Total 45,703 285,460
SouRCE: Derived from RECHTSPFLEGE 1976, supra, at 70-73 (Tables 6 & 7).
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compromise of discouraging but not forbidding the imposition of
short-term prison sentences probably has led to this result. As
Jiirgen Baumann has written, "if one really wants to eliminate the
short jail sentence, a solution such as the one proposed in section
36 of the Alternative Draft [no sentences under six months] cannot
be avoided."79
B. Accurate Adjustments of the Fine to the Economic and Per-
sonal Circumstances of the Offender
The Second Criminal Law Reform Act instituted a formalized
method of adjusting fines to the economic and personal circum-
stances of the offender.80 The Max Planck Institute for Foreign
and International Criminal Law conducted an investigation into
the effectiveness of the Act. Figure 1 presents the distribution of
fines that the Institute found before and after the 1975 reform.81
Figure 1 suggests that the reform had little effect on the distribu-
tion of fines below 1500 marks, but fines above 1500 marks in-
creased noticeably after the new law took effect. There may be two
explanations for the change in the distribution of fines. First, the
reforms may have had their desired effect of burdening more afflu-
ent offenders with progressively higher fines.8 2 Second, rather than
punishing offenders according to their economic circumstances, the
courts may simply have begun to punish particular crimes more
harshly.83 The second explanation, however, is foreclosed by data
from the Max Planck Institute study that show that the part of the
fine keyed to the offender's circumstances, not the part keyed to
the severity of the crime, was the element that changed.8 4
That the larger number of high fines is explained by reference
to the offender's income does not prove that the Second Criminal
Law Reform Act is a success. The Act sought not only to adjust
fines to the economic circumstances of the offender, but to do so
accurately as well.85 To evaluate the accuracy of such adjustments,
79 ALTERNATIvE DRAFT, supra note 17, at 37 (commentary of J. Baumann).
80 See supra notes 42-45 and accompanying text.
81 H.-J. ALBRECHT, supra note 31, at 202.
82 Id. at 203.
83 Id.
8 See id. The distribution of the number of day-fine units, the component of the fine
based on the culpability of the offender, see supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text, im-
posed during 1975 correlates with the distribution of the number of days of default impris-
onment, also a measure of culpability, imposed in 1972 under the old system. See H.-J.
ALBRECHT, supra note 31, at 203 (Graph 5).
85 See generally supra notes 32, 42-44 and accompanying text.
[50:281
West German Day-Fine System
the Institute surveyed the information to which a sample of West
German courts had access when calculating fines.
FIGURE 1
DiSTRmtrrION OF FiaNS, 1972 AND 1975
200 400' 600 800 1000 1500 2000 West German
Marks
. - - fine amount under fixed-sums system (1972)
S= fine amount under variable day-fine system (1975)
SOURCE: H.-J. ALBRECHT, supra note 31, at 202.
The Institute's study revealed that in over fifty-four percent of
the cases in which a court imposed a day-fine the court had no
information about the defendant's income."6 In over seventy-five
percent of the cases, the court had no information about the defen-
86 H.-J. ALBRECHT, supra note 31, at 204. The study also revealed that willingness toprovide information about income varies among professions. Unskilled workers were the
most likely to provide information; the self-employed were the least likely to do so. See id.
at 178 (Table 76).
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dant's wealth."' In only 1.7 % of the surveyed cases did the court or
state prosecutor's office make a supplementary investigation into
the defendant's income or wealth. 8
In those cases in which the defendant's economic circum-
stances were known to the court, the value of the day-fine unit did
vary in proportion to income. 9 In those cases in which the court
lacked information about the defendant's economic circumstances,
the Institute could not discover the factors that determined the
valuation of the day-fine unit. The Institute surmised, however,
that the defendant's profession and marital status were the chief
factors affecting the choice of a value.9 0
The court's lack of information about offender income and
wealth in over one-half of the cases in which a day-fine is imposed
undercuts two of the goals of the Second Criminal Law Reform
Act. First, West German courts cannot impose a fine whose culpa-
bility and income components are trustworthy when they have no
information concerning income. 1 Second, the lack of information
about an offender's income undermines the goal of effecting equal-
ity in the impact of fines.92 When a court guesses the income of an
offender, there is a large margin for error, and the resulting fine
can be inadequate or overly burdensome.
Not all goals of the day-fine adjustment method have been un-
dermined by the dearth of information before the courts about of-
fender income. The goal of fine collection9 3 has been met. The Max
Planck study shows that nearly fifty percent of all day-fines are
paid immediately.94 Slightly more than thirty percent are paid fol-
lowing the grant of an installment or delayed payment schedule.
Attachment of property is ordered in approximately eleven percent
7 Id. at 205.
8 Id.
89 Id. at 209. Downward adjustment of the day-fine is well established in West Ger-
many. For example, judges frequently reduce the day-fine after considering the offender's
support obligations. See Tr6ndle, supra note 44, § 40 Rdn. 41. The theory underlying this
practice is that an offender without dependents should not receive better treatment, in ef-
fect, than one who earns a like salary but supports others. Grebing, supra note 16, at 108.
The Criminal Code does not indicate whether the court may further increase the amount of
the day-fine for an offender with large personal wealth not represented in his income. Tr6n-
die, supra note 44, § 40 Rdn. 52.
0H.-J. ALBRECHT, supra note 31, at 210-14.
92 Although the courts must publish the two components in the sentencing order, see
supra note 46 and accompanying text, the lack of support for the income component ren-
ders its accuracy suspect.
92 Cf. supra note 31 and accompanying text.
93 See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
"H.-J. ALBRECHT, supra note 31, at 233.
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of all cases and is successful in one out of five such cases. Payment
follows an official threat of imprisonment in close to eleven percent
of all cases. In only about four percent of all cases do offenders
serve default prison terms.9 5 It may be that the high collection rate
results from imposing fines commensurate with offenders' abilities
to pay. If so, then courts may be able to adjust fines more accu-
rately than the Institute's study otherwise would suggest, and the
Second Reform Act would accordingly be more successful.
III. A DAY-FINE SYSTEM FOR THE UNITED STATES?
West Germany's reduced dependence on short-term incarcera-
tion and its increased use of the day-fine is intriguing to the Amer-
ican observer critical of this country's overwhelming reliance on in-
carceration as a means of punishment." In 1979, prison terms
constituted approximately forty-four percent and fines only about
thirteen percent of all sentences handed down by United States
federal district courts. 7 This pattern of punishment is not unique
to the American federal courts,98 but it differs dramatically from
West German practice. In 1979, for a wide variety of crimes, West
German courts imposed prison sentences in seventeen percent of
the cases and fines in eighty-two percent of the cases.99 Moreover,
the difficulties associated with heavy reliance on short-term im-
I5 !d.
See supra notes 7-10 and accompanying text.
Of 32,913 offenders sentenced by the federal district courts in the year ending June
30, 1979, some 14,580 received prison sentences, and 4368 were assessed fines. BUREAU OF
JusTIcE STATISTICS, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUS-
TICE STATIsTIcs-1980, at 434-35 (1980) (Table 5.24) [hereinafter cited as CRiMINAL Jus'c
STATISTICs]. Of the offenders sent to prison, 2320 received sentences of 1 to 12 months. Id.
" For example, in 1974, the Superior Court of Washington, D.C. imposed a prison sen-
tence on 36% but a fine on only 6% of all convicted defendants. Gillespie, supra note 7, at
25 (Table 3). American state laws currently permit sentencing judges to impose short-term
sentences for offenses such as simple assault, see, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-3-1 (1978)
(petty misdemeanor, for which the code permits a sentence of six months or less, id. § 31-
19-1(B)), adultery, see, e.g., Criminal Code of 1961, § 11-7, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 11-7
(1981) (class A misdemeanor for which the code permits a sentence of less than one year, id.
§ 1005-8-3(a)(1)), and petty theft, see, e.g., id. § 16-1(e)(1) (class A misdemeanor).
" See RECHTSPFLEGE 1979, supra note 73, at 72-73. For specific crimes, the contrast
between the United States and West Germany is particularly striking. In 1979, West Ger-
man courts imposed a fine on about 66% of those convicted of a broad range of assault-type
offenses. See id. In 1979, United States district courts imposed a fine on fewer than 8% of
the criminal defendants convicted of assault. See CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATIsTICs, supra note
97, at 434-35. Similarly, approximately 76% of the German defendants convicted of theft,
larceny, or embezzlement in 1979 were fined, see RECHTSPFLEGE 1979, supra note 73, at 72-
73, whereas just over 5% of the American defendants sentenced for the same group of of-
fenses incurred a fine, see CRIMINAL JusrICE STATIsTICS, supra note 97, at 434-35.
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prisonment (e.g., overcrowded prisons and the severing of social
ties that lead to rehabilitation) noted in West German reform liter-
ature of the 1960's10O are present today in the American criminal
justice system. 10 1
Nevertheless, it is premature to conclude that West Germany's
success justifies adoption of the West German system by United
States jurisdictions. A legislature might not want to adopt the day-
fine system if fines prove less successful than imprisonment in de-
terring crime or recidivism.10 2 Inquiry into such matters is beyond
the scope of this comment. Presumably, however, a day-fine is an
adequate sanction for at least those crimes already punishable by
fine in this country,103 and one can assess the chances of success of
a day-fine system for those crimes in the United States.10 4
The West German Criminal Law Reform Acts have fallen
short of their goals in three ways. First, they have not succeeded in
eliminating short-term imprisonment as a significant sanction for
at least some crimes.10 5 Second, it is difficult for West German
courts to impose fines whose income components accurately reflect
an offender's income. Finally, because of this difficulty it is not
clear that the courts have been able to effectuate the goal of im-
posing an equal impact on offenders of varied incomes convicted of
the same crime.108 This part identifies two considerations that
would make the operation and effect of a day-fine system different
in United States jurisdictions than in West Germany: the Ameri-
can courts' access to information about offender income and the
distribution of income within the American population.0 7
100 See sources cited supra note 16.
101 See supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text.
1o For a discussion of the theories and purposes of criminal sanctions, see generally W.
LAFAVE & A. Scorr JR., HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW § 5 (1972).
103 E.g., MICH. CoMP. LAws § 257.901 (1979) (misdemeanor violation of the Vehicle
Code punishable by fine and/or imprisonment); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 60.01(3) (McKinney
1975) (misdemeanor punishable by fine and/or imprisonment).
104 Under the laws of many states, courts imposing fines are to take the offender's abil-
ity to pay into account when setting the fine amount. See, e.g., Unified Code of Corrections
§ 5-9-1(d), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-9-1(d) (1981) ("In determining the amount and
method of payment of a fine, the court shall consider ... the financial resources and future
ability of the offender to pay the fine . . . ."). This rough adjustment to offender income
corresponds to the West German fining practice prior to the Second Criminal Law Reform
Act. See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text.
101 See supra notes 75-79 and accompanying text.
106 See supra notes 85-92 and accompanying text.
0 It is also worth considering the possibility that any large-scale system of fines ulti-
mately may use imprisonment to cope with payment defaults. Imprisonment of indigents in
default could raise equal protection problems in the United States. See Tate v. Short, 401
U.S. 395 (1971); Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235 (1970). In Williams an indigent defendant
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A. Access to Income Information
The West German federal parliament has refused to vest crim-
inal courts with the power to compel an offender to disclose his
income."' 8 Without such data, it is difficult for the courts to impose
a fine commensurate with the offender's means. This frustrates the
goals of equal impact on equally culpable criminals and clear de-
lineation of the culpability and income components of the day-
fine.1°9 American courts should have an easier time calculating ac-
curate awards because they have greater access to information
about an offender's income.
American law and practice provide sentencing judges with a
considerable amount of information about an offender. For exam-
ple, Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(c) directs the proba-
tion service to conduct a presentence investigation of the offender
convicted of theft was sentenced to the statutory maximum of one year's imprisonment and
a $500 fine, plus five dollars in court costs. After he completed the one-year prison term, the
offender was unable to satisfy the fine. Pursuant to an Illinois statute, he then was impris-
oned for an additional 101 days to "work off" the fine at the rate of five dollars per day. The
Supreme Court held the practice of fine conversion unconstitutional because the "Illinois
statute in operative effect exposes only indigents to the risk of imprisonment beyond the
statutory maximum." Williams, 399 U.S. at 242.
In Tate v. Short, the Court confronted the case of an indigent convicted of an offense
that carried only a monetary sanction. The Texas state court had committed the indigent
offender to prison pursuant to a Texas statute that allowed imprisonment if an offender was
incapable of paying a fine. The Court struck down the practice:
Since Texas has legislated a "fines only" policy for traffic offenses, that statutory ceil-
ing cannot, consistently with the Equal Protection Clause, limit the punishment to
payment of the fine if one is able to pay it, yet convert the fine into a prison term for
an indigent defendant without the means to pay his fine. Imprisonment in such a case
is not imposed to further any penal objective of the State. It is imposed to augment the
State's revenues but obviously does not serve that purpose; the defendant cannot pay
because he is indigent and his imprisonment, rather than aiding collection of the reve-
nue, saddles the State with the cost of feeding and housing him for the period of his
imprisonment.
Tate, 401 U.S. at 399.
In neither Tate nor Williams did the Court preclude the use of default imprisonment.
See Tate, 401 U.S. at 400-01 (the determination of the constitutionality of default imprison-
ment when alternative means of enforcement are unsuccessful must "await the presentment
of a concrete case"); Williams, 399 U.S at 243-44 ("We have no occasion to reach the ques-
tion whether a State is precluded in any other circumstances from holding an indigent ac-
countable for a fine by use of a penal sanction."). It is possible that the Court would find
default imprisonment unconstitutional, but that result is far from certain. Even if the Court
were to do so, however, a day-fine system would still be possible. It is not the fine that
would be unconstitutional, and alternative means of handling defaults might be found.
Hence the potential equal protection problems of default imprisonment by themselves
should not rule out the use of the day-fine in the United States.
108 See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
100 See supra notes 91-92 and accompanying text.
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and to present it to the sentencing court.110 The report must con-
tain, inter alia, "such information about [the offender's]...
financial condition as may be helpful in imposing sentence."11' The
Supreme Court has cited rule 32 for the proposition that before
imposing sentence a federal judge "may appropriately conduct an
inquiry broad' in scope, largely unlimited either as to the kind of
information he may consider, or the source from which it may
come."' 12 Likewise, the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 pro-
vides that courts may receive background information about an of-
fender without limit for purposes of determining an appropriate
sentence." 3 The statute has been interpreted to allow federal
courts to consider otherwise inadmissible evidence in the sentenc-
ing process. 114
110 FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(c). The presentence report is mandatory unless, "with the per-
mission of the court, the defendant waives a presentence investigation and report, or the
court finds that there is in the record information sufficient to enable the meaningful exer-
cise of sentencing discretion." Id. 32(c)(1).
. Id. 32(c)(2). The rule provides in full:
The report of the presentence investigation shall contain any prior criminal record of
the defendant and such information about his characteristics, his financial condition
and the circumstances affecting his behavior as may be helpful in imposing sentence or
in granting probation or in the correctional treatment of the defendant, and such other
information as may be required by the court.
Id. Such reporting is not unique to the federal courts. Illinois presentence reports, for exam-
ple, must set forth "(1) the defendant's history of delinquency or criminality, physical and
mental history and condition, family situation and background, economic status, education,
occupation and personal habits; . . . and (6) any other matters. . . the court directs to be
included." Unified Code of Corrections § 5-3-2(a), ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-3-2(a)
(1981).
112 United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 446 (1972) (citations omitted). The reporters
cite this statement to FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(a)(2), not FED. R. CraM. P. 32(c)(2). Tucker, 404
U.S. at 447; 92 S. Ct. 589, 591; 30 L. Ed. 2d 592, 596. This is an obvious typographical error;
the Court could not have been referring to rule 32(a)(2), which provides for notification to
the defendant of his right to appeal. More recently, the Court quoted approvingly the quo-
tation in text, calling it a "fundamental sentencing principle." United States v. Grayson, 438
U.S. 41, 50 (1978).
113 Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, § 1001(a), 18 U.S.C. § 3577 (1976) ("No limi-
tation shall be placed on the information concerning the background, character, and con-
duct of a person convicted of an offense which a court of the United States may receive and
consider for purposes of imposing an appropriate sentence."). The statutory scheme set up
by the Act provides for special increased sentences for "dangerous special offenders," 18
U.S.C. § 3575 (1976 & Supp. V 1981), but the prerogative of a federal court to inquire into
the defendant's background has not been extended to cases in which the defendant is not a
"dangerous special offender." See United States v. Garcia, 544 F.2d 681, 684 (3d Cir. 1976).
"" See, e.g., Smith v. United States, 551 F.2d 1193, 1196 (10th Cir.) (court may con-
sider history of prior arrests), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 830 (1977); United States v. Lee, 540
F.2d 1205, 1210 & n.11 (4th Cir.) (court may consider unlawfully seized evidence), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 894 (1976); cf. United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41, 50 (1978) (court may
consider defendant's false trial testimony in fixing sentence).
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These provisions suggest that at least federal courts already
have the authority to order the production of the offender's tax
return to facilitate sentencing, " 5 but under current law the Inter-
nal Revenue Service is not permitted to disclose tax returns in
such circumstances." 6 Other sources are available. It is likely, for
example, that courts possess the authority to compel disclosure of
financial documents from the defendant's accountant" 7 or attor-
ney.11 s They also probably could compel the offender to produce
his own tax returns, for purposes of sentencing, without violating
the fifth amendment's protection against compelled self-incrimina-
tion." 9 In sum, American criminal law presupposes an active fact-
115 Even if a particular state's statutes do not currently extend similar powers to trial
judges to compel production of tax returns, the West German experience might convince the
state's legislature to confer such power on state court judges if it adopts the day-fine
sanction.
I" State officials are entitled to federal returns only to the extent necessary to adminis-
ter the state's tax laws. I.R.C. § 6103(d) (Supp. V 1981). As for federal courts, returns or
return information
may be entered into evidence in any administrative or judicial proceeding pertaining to
enforcement of a specifically designated Federal criminal statute (not involving tax ad-
ministration) . . .but. . .only if the court finds that such return or return informa-
tion is probative of a matter in issue relevant in establishing the commission of a
crime or the guilt of a party.
I.R.C. § 6103(i)(4) (1976) (emphasis added).
117 See United States v. Couch, 409 U.S. 322, 328-29 (1973). In Couch, the Court upheld
over fifth amendment objections a court order compelling a defendant's accountant to pro-
duce all of the defendant's financial statements in the accountant's possession. The Court's
reasoning in upholding the order was that "[t]he Fifth Amendment privilege is a personal
privilege: it adheres basically to the person, not to the information that may incriminate
him." Id. at 328. Because the accountant, not the defendant, was "the only one compelled to
do anything," coercion "against a potentially accused person [was] absent." Id. at 329.
"0 Under the holding of Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976), courts can compel
a defendant's attorney to produce financial working papers concerning the defendant and
prepared by a third party. The fifth amendment did not preclude disclosure in Fisher be-
cause the papers "were not prepared by the taxpayer, and [because] they contain[ed] no
testimonial declarations by him." Id. at 409. Nor were the documents protected by the at-
torney-client privilege, because "documents which could have been obtained by court pro-
cess from the client when he was in possession may also be obtained from the attorney by
similar process following transfer" of the papers to him. Id. at 403.
"' U.S. CONsT. amend. V. Although no case directly addresses this point, it is supported
by the Court's repeated finding that the sentencing process is subject to less exacting consti-
tutional scrutiny than are the pretrial and trial processes. See, e.g., Williams v. Oklahoma,
358 U.S. 576, 584 (1959) ("once the guilt of the accused has been properly established, the
sentencing judge, in determining the kind and extent of punishment to be imposed, is not
restricted to evidence derived from the examination and cross-examination of witnesses in
open court but may, consistent with the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment,
consider unsworn . . . information"); Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 246-48 (1949)
(the historical separation of sentencing and guilt determination procedures, as well as sound
practical reasons, support the relative laxity of evidentiary rules in sentencing as compared
to trial procedure). The Court also has held that the guarantee of U.S. CONsT. amend. V
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finding role for the judge during sentencing. Because income infor-
mation is likely to be available to the court from tax returns or
elsewhere, a court in the United States should be able to calculate
day-fines more accurately than can a West German court.
B. Economic Incentives
The advantages of day-fine adjustment-transparent calcula-
tion, equality of the impact of the fine, and lowered probability of
default in payments-are desirable only if they can be effected
without diminishing the economic disincentive to crime created by
the penalties of the criminal law. The practice of adjusting the
day-fine to the offender's income can change the economic incen-
tives facing a potential criminal. An example illustrates the prob-
lem. Suppose that a person is assessing the consequences of com-
mitting a crime from which he would gain $10,000 if successfully
completed. The would-be criminal draws the potential fine and the
probability of being conv'icted into his assessment: 2 '
Expected Gain = (Probability of Success) x (Potential Benefit) -
(Probability of Conviction) x (Potential Fine).
If he anticipates a forty percent chance of being sentenced to an
$18,000 day-fine, he should expect a net $1200 loss,12" ' and hence he
will face an economic disincentive to commit the crime. If the po-
tential criminal is less well-off, however, and he knows he will face
a day-fine of only $13,000, he can expect a net gain of $800 from
the deed.1 22 More generally, when an individual's income is below
some threshold, he will face an economic incentive to commit cer-
tain crimes, and the incentive increases with diminishing income.
This skewing of incentives by an income-adjusted day-fine sys-
tem results from the fact that the potential benefit of a crime is a
constant value, but the potential cost of a crime decreases with
diminishing income. The skewing effect is most acute when the
day-fine is imposed on low-income offenders. Perhaps the reason
against self-incrimination is limited to "protect[ion] against 'compelled self-incrimination,
not [the disclosure of] private information.'" Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 401
(1976) (quoting United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 233 n.7 (1975)). Hence the fifth
amendment should pose no bar to compelled production of a tax return for sentencing pur-
poses: because the court would be using the records for sentencing and not to determine
liability, the records would not be incriminating.
120 See generally R. POSNER, ECONoMic ANALYSIS OF THE LAW § 7.2 (2d ed. 1977); Beck-
er, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169 (1968).
121 Expected Gain = (0.6 x $10,000) - (0.4 x $18,000) = $6000 - $7200 = (-)$1200.
22 Expected Gain = (0.6 x $10,000) - (0.4 x $13,000) = $6000 - $5200 = $800.
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West German commentators have not noticed this incentive to
crime is that West Germany enjoys substantial income homogene-
ity. In 1978, only 8.6% of all West German males with income had
less than $4800 net income.123 In 1978, 25.3% of all American
males with income had less than $5000 in gross earnings. 12 West
Germans' incomes are concentrated much more toward the middle
of the income distribution spectrum than are Americans' incomes.
In 1978, close to sixty percent of all West German males with in-
come earned between $7200 and $13,200 net.12 5 In the United
States in 1978, only 30.4% of all males with income earned be-
tween $7000 and $15,000 gross. S In the United States, therefore, a
day-fine system might create incentives for a sizeable population
group to commit certain crimes. To avoid these incentives, Ameri-
can jurisdictions adopting a day-fine system could set a minimum
fine for each offense. Minimum fines would eliminate for low-in-
come criminals the ideal of more precise adjustments of the fines
according to income, but such minimum fines would preserve the
disincentive to criminal activity that criminal sanctions are in-
tended to create. Thus although the income distribution in the
United States might make it difficult to copy the West German
system exactly, the presence of a large low-income population in
this country does not foreclose the possibility of a successful day-
fine system. 2 7
' See STATISTISCHES BUNDESAMT, STATISTISCHES JAHRBUCH 1979 FOR DIE BUNDESREPUB-
LIK DEUTSCHLAND 97 (1979) (Table 6.5.4) [hereinafter cited as STATISTISCHES JAHRBUCH].
This section uses statistics arrived at by converting figures stated in West German marks to
American dollars at the rate of two marks to one dollar. The 2:1 conversion rate is the
rounded mean rate of exchange for the years 1977 (2.10:1) and 1978 (1.83:1). Id. at 314
(Table 14.10).
"I4 See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT
OF THE UNITED STATES 1980, at 462 (1980) (Table 767) [hereinafter cited as STATISTICAL
ABSTRACT OF THE U.S.].
:25 See STATISTIScHES JAHRBUcH, supra note 123, at 97.
11 See STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE U.S., supra note 124, at 462.
'1 The West German day-fine system suffers from a second economic shortcoming,
which results from the Criminal Code's failure to specify the value of each day-fine unit in
terms of a variable fraction of the offender's income. See supra note 44 and accompanying
text. Without statutory guidance, it is possible that a West German judge will follow the
Swedish practice, see supra note 45 and accompanying text, of using a fixed fraction of
income. Setting the value of all offenders' day-fine units equal to a fixed fraction of income
is economically unsound because it hinders imposing an equal detriment on similarly culpa-
ble offenders. The necessity of using a fraction that varies upward with income has been
demonstrated in the context of progressive taxation. See W. BLUM & H. KALVEN, THE UN-
EASY CASE FOR PROGREssrV TAxATION 39-45 (1953). Their arguments are equally persuasive
in considering the day-fine.
In economic terms, the day-fine is intended to impose equal disutility on equally culpa-
ble offenders. Imposition of equal disutility can have either of two meanings. First, it can
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CONCLUSION
West Germany's Criminal Law Reform Acts of 1969 were in-
tended to reduce substantially the use of short-term prison
sentences, to impose sanctions that burden equally culpable people
in equal fashion and with a clear connection to the criminal's cul-
pability, and to establish a method of calculating fines such that all
offenders would be able to pay them. In some respects, the reforms
have met their goals: short-term imprisonment is now the excep-
tion rather than the rule; the fines apparently are adjusted accord-
ing to the income of the offender whenever possible; virtually all
offenders pay their fines. In other respects, the reforms have fallen
short of their mark: short-term prison sentences are still common
for some crimes; courts lack sufficient information to calculate ac-
curately the component of the fine related to income; the fines do
not clearly impose an equivalent burden on equally culpable of-
fenders. Evidence concerning the effectiveness of the day-fine at
deterring crime and recidivism is incomplete. It would be prema-
ture, therefore, to recommend that jurisdictions in the United
States adopt the West German day-fine system, but this comment
has identified some aspects of the system that could be varied to
make it more successful in the United States if and when it proves
desirable to adopt the day-fine here.
Gary M. Friedman
mean that every offender must surrender a fixed amount of utility. See id. at 42. Under this
definition, the fine for each crime would be the same for all offenders, regardless of their
wealth. The West German day-fine does not opt for this approach. Second, imposition of
equal disutility can mean that every offender must surrender a fixed percentage of the total
utility he derives from money. See id. at 43-44. Only a variable fine can achieve this effect;
exacting a fixed percentage of every offender's income will not result in the desired propor-
tionate sacrifice. By taking a fixed percentage of every offender's income, the court can im-
pose on the wealthy offender only a nominally greater fine than it imposes on the poor
offender, because the wealthy person derives less utility from each additional dollar of in-
come than does the poor person. Cf. id. at 40-41. To exact an equal percentage of the total
utility that each offender derives from money, therefore, a fine must take progressively more
away from each additional dollar of income. Only a progressively graduated scale, exacting
ever greater percentages of pre-tax income, will produce the desired effect. Cf. id. at 43.
Thus, if an American jurisdiction were to adopt the day-fine calculation method, and it
wanted to impose equal disutility on equally culpable offenders, the jurisdiction would have
to adopt a progressively graduated scale of day-fine values.
